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ABSTRACT
. May, Ronald L. , .M.S.C.E., Purdue University, August, 1974
RTOR; Warrants and Benefits . Major Professor: Harold L.
Michael.
This research was designed to examine intersection
approaches utilizing the RTOR maneuver in an attempt to
identify problems resulting from the maneuver and benefits
that could be derived from it. Attempts were made to
determine intersection characteristics which are common to
these problems and benefits. The report includes a summary
of the literature as of 1972 on the RTOR maneuver.
Data for this study were obtained from a study of
intersections in Lafayette, Indiana and at intersections
in Indianapolis, Indiana. Before studies were conducted at
the Lafayette intersections, signs were then erected, and
after a period of time additional studies were performed
to observe the changes which occurred. The intersections
in Indianapolis where the RTOR maneuver v/as already in use
were examined to determine the effects of the RTOR maneuver.
The results of this study agree with the accident
analysis of other studies. The total number of accidents
at the study intersections did not increase. Neither, was
there clear evidence that they decreased. It was also
found that intersection approaches with a right-tum-only
lane, lower speeds on the cross street, shorter cycle
length, and only one lane of traffic on the cross street
had a greater usage of RTOR opportunities. It v;as also
found that no delays or hazards v;ere encountered by
pedestrians as a result of the RTOR m.aneuver. Delay re-
duction to right turning vehicles was found to exist, but
IX
no means to predict the amount of delay reduction to be
expected was developed. A graphical relationship between
the number of opportunities for vehicles to turn into the
cross traffic, and the volume of vehicles on the cross
street was developed.
Finally, suggested v/arrants for prohibition of the
1
RTOR maneuver were developed. These warrants are sub-
divided into three groups: 1) those required for reasons
of safety; 2) those permissive for reasons of little
benefit from the maneuver; and 3) those permissive because
of adverse public reaction.
CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION
In 1937, authorities in California decided that
motorists were wasting too much time waiting for red traffic
signals. At that time they authorized a traffic maneuver
known as right turn on red (RTOR) . The original maneuver
permitted a motorist to make a right turn while facing a
red signal only when a sign was in place which stated that
the driver could do so (restrictive RTOR) . The driver was
also required to stop first and yield to all pedestrians
and vehicles legally within the intersection. After ten
years of use with limited application and using a sign to
permit the maneuver, some authorities believed that the
maneuver would work at almost every traffic signal (per-
missive RTOR). In 1947, the state of California began per-
mitting the RTOR maneuver at all locations unless a sign
was in place which prohibited the driver from making the
turn.
Until recently very little attention was given to the
RTOR maneuver. Some of the states joined California and
adopted the rule which permitted the RTOR maneuver unless
a sign prohibited the turn. In the midwest and east some
states adopted the rule which permitted the RTOR maneuver
only at locations where a sign was in place allowing the
driver to make the turn. Very few efforts were made to
research the maneuver. In 1956 Ray (27) conducted research
in California to measure the decrease in delay resulting
from the RTOR maneuver, and the effect on the number of
accidents. Similar studies were conducted on a smaller
scale in various locations. Little effort was made to
determine at what locations, if any, the RTOR maneuver
would function smoothly and safely.
In the 1960 edition of the Manual on Uniform Traffic
Control Devices for Streets and Highways (MUTCD) , the RTOR
maneuver was highly discouraged. Since that time, members
of the traffic engineering profession have debated whether
or not the RTOR maneuver should even be permitted. Further-
more, those members of the profession in favor of the RTOR
maneuver have not been able to agree on the method of
signing. Nevertheless, the use of the RTOR maneuver con-
tinued to spread. In the 1971 edition of the MUTCD, the
RTOR maneuver is permitted but only at locations where signs
are in place allowing the driver to make the turn. In
recent years, the RTOR maneuver has become widely accepted,
but still in many places the maneuver is used only at ideal
locations.
In August of 1972, the National Highway Traffic Safety
Administration (NHTSA) proposed in the Federal Register that
all states would be required to enact legislation to permit
the RTOR maneuver at all locations unless a sign is in
place prohibiting the turn (7) . This proposal brought the
issue of RTOR to the foreground. The Institute of Traffic
Engineers passed a formal resolution which opposed the
method by which NHTSA vs^as attempting to establish the use
of the RTOR maneuver. It recommended that the accepted
method be that as promulgated through established means,
through the National Committee procedure which existed for
revisions in the Uniform Vehicle Code (UVC) and the MUTCD.
It would seem that the best approach in determining
how the RTOR maneuver should be signed would be to establish
a set of warrants for use of the maneuver. By having a
technique for selecting intersection approaches
where the RTOR maneuver will function smoothly and safely
the number of RTOR approaches could be determined. By
knowing this number of approaches a more logical signing
choice could be made. After reviewing the literature, it
was found that no generally accepted warrants for the use
of RTOR have been developed .With this knowledge, this
research project was begun to determine warrants and benefits
associated with the RTOR maneuver.
The approach taken was to relate the effects of the
RTOR maneuver to intersection characteristics which could
be easily measured. It v;as agreed that accidents should be
related to these characteristics since safety is very
important. Other effects expected to be important were
pedestrian delay and inconvenience, vehicle delays, driver
irritation, opportunities for RTOR, acceptance of such
opportunities, etc.
CHAPTER 2. REVIEW OF LITERATURE
Throughout the history of the RTOR maneuver no one has
designed and performed a well organized study to examine the
effects of the maneuver on the existing traffic. Of the
studies that have been conducted, the majority dealt with
collection of accident data for intersections where the
maneuver was currently being used. The literature on RTOR
can be easily divided into the areas of surveys of present
use, accident studies, vehicle delay or travel tim.e studies,
gap availability, effects on capacity and level of service,
and surveys of the warrants and intersection characteristics
for using or not using the RTOR maneuver. Many of these
reports dealt v;ith more than one area. Some reports dealt
with theoretical discussions while others were reports of
actual field studies.
Present Use
The first area mentioned is present use of the RTOR
maneuver. In 19 72, thirty-two states permitted the RTOR
maneuver in one form or another. These states are illustrated
in Figure 1. Of these thirty-two states, nineteen allov/ed
RTOR only when a sign was in place permitting the maneuver
(21) . Most of these states conformed v/ith the UVC (21) by
requiring the driver to stop first and yield to pedestrians
or other vehicles legally using the intersection. However,
Arkansas and Tennessee did not require the vehicle to stop
































































Eleven of the remaining states permitted the RTOR
maneuver at all signalized intersection approaches unless
a sign was in place which prohibited the maneuver. These
states also required the vehicle to stop and yield to
pedestrians and other vehicles. The laws of the states of
Nevada and Oregon made no provisions for signs of any kind,
and Oregon did not require the vehicle to stop.
To add to the confusion, the city of Little Rock,
Arkansas, violated their state law by permitting the RTOR
maneuver by use of a green right turn arrow in place of
a permissive sign. This green right-turn arrow does not
mean that a vehicle can make a protected right turn as it
means in other locations. In the state of Michigan, some
cities used a flashing red right-turn arrow to signify a
RTOR maneuver as the RTOR maneuver was not specifically
provided in their state laws. In 1973 many states recon-
sidered their laws concerning the RTOR maneuver. As an
example, Indiana passed legislation effective July 1, 1974
(35) to permit RTOR at any intersection in the state unless
a sign restricts the maneuver. Illinois made a similar
revision in their RTOR maneuver laws. It appears that the
recent NHTSA proposal (7) will prompt other states to
reconsider their laws.
Two interesting facts can be seen by looking at the
present state laws governing the RTOR maneuver. First, the
western states were first to use the RTOR maneuver and most
strongly support its use while the eastern states most
strongly oppose its use. It now appears that the permissive
use of the RTOR maneuver is gradually spreading east across
the country. The other item of interest is that locations
using the permissive law permitted the RTOR maneuver at
approximately ninety-six percent of their signalized inter-
sections while locations using the restrictive law permitted
the RTOR maneuver at only approximately two percent of the
signalized intersections (17) . These signalized intersections
are probably obviously safe approaches so in reality the
RTOR maneuver is seldom permitted except at such obviously
safe locations when the restrictive law is used.
Accident Studies
The area given the most interest in the past has been
accidents. Virtually every report on the RTOR maneuver
has performed some accident analysis. One of the earlier
studies conducted to examine the RTOR maneuver was performed
by James Ray (27) in the San Francisco Bay area. In tl^is
study seventy-five intersections were studied. A total of
3,338 accidents were reported at these locations, but only
twelve accidents involved RTOR vehicles. This data is
tabulated in Table 1. These twelve accidents comprise only
0.3 of one percent of all accidents. Similarly, less than
0.8 of one percent of personal injury accidents v/ere
attributed to the RTOR maneuver. None of the RTOR accidents
caused major personal injury. Further examination sliowcd
that eleven percent of the right turning accidents involved
RTOR vehicles while the RTOR volume was eighteen percent
of the total volume. This difference proved to be
significant at a ninety-eiglit percent confidence level and
led to the conclusion that the RTOR maneuver was at least
no more dangerous than right rurn on green. The findings
were the same for peak and nonpeak volumes.
RTOR pedestrian accidents consisted of twenty-tv/o
percent of the total right turn pedestrian accidents. .Al-
though this was greater than the eighteen percent volume
of the RTOR maneuver the difference proved not to be
significant at a ninety-eight percent confidence level.
This led to the conclusion that the RTOR maneuver was no
more dangerous to pedestrians than right turn on green.
The general consensus of replies to a questionnaire used
in the study was that RTOR accidents represented an in-
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In a summary of the RTOR maneuver practice in the
western United States, Mathison (17) reported that the RTOP.
maneuve'r does not significantly contribute to accident
experience. Only 0.77 of one percent of all accidents were
attributed to the RTOR maneuver v;here the permissive lav;
was used. However, where the restrictive law v/as used the
accident experience varied greatly. It was felt that this
variance may have resulted from inconsistencies in the
signing techniques.
A study conducted by Howard in Jacksonville, Florida,
examined 405 intersections (12). This report indicated
that 0.74 of one percent of 1,756 accidents reported at
these locations could be attributed to the RTOR maneuver.
Only 0.11 of one percent were classified as vehicle-
pedestrian accidents attributable to the RTOR maneuver.
Traffic volumes were not available so exposures could not
be calculated. At the time of the study, the state of
Florida did not provide for the RTOR maneuver as a basic
rule. This lack of uniformity could have actually raised
the accident rate.
A report from a study performed in Colorado Springs,
Colorado, indicated a high degree of success of the RTOR
maneuver (32). After approximately one year of operation
at eighteen approaches to ten intersections, no accidents
had been reported which could be attributed to the RTOR
maneuver. However, the RTOR maneuver was used only under
"ideal" conditions. The following characteristics were
required for RTOR installations
:
1. A high percentage (25%) of the total volume of
vehicular traffic in a given direction must
turn right.
2. Delay to through-traffic was caused regularly
by right-turn movements and/or right-turn
veliicles typically were unable to clear on the
green phase.
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3. Very lov; pedestrian volumes existed and there
v;as available a lane for the exclusive use of
right-turning vehicles.
4. Streets v/ere of sufficient v;idth to accommodate
tlio RTOR maneuver without undue or exceptional
hazard, conflict or interference with other
traffic.
In a similar situation in Santa Anna, California, Ray
(28) reported that no accidents resulted from the RTOR
maneuver. Tlie city had thirty-six signalized intersections,
but at thirteen of tliem the RTOR maneuver v;as prohibited.
The study lasted for tv/o years and four months. The study
showed four pedestrians injured and one Icilled resulting
from right-turning vehicle accidents. All of these
accidents occurred while the vehicles were turning on the
green.
In a study conducted in Los Angeles, California, Scott
(30) reported that RTOR accidents amounted to less than
0.30 of one percent of all accidents at signalized inter-
sections. lIov;ever, RTOR vehicle-pedestrian accidents were
slightly greater than two percent of the total vehicle-
pedestrian accidents at all signalized intersections.
In a more recent study by the Minnesota Department of
Highways, 197 intersections v.'ere examined in a before and
after study (36). 1967 v;as used as the before period
while 1968 v;as used as the after period. A problem
occurred in that the 1967 accident data v:as incomplete.
However, the following results were obtained. Accidents
occurred at only thirty-tV'/o of the 197 intersections or
sixteen percent. The before data shov/ed that the thirty-
two intersections had only nineteen percent of the total
accidents. In the after study, the same thirty-tv;o inter-
section accident total v;as tv;enty percent of the total
accidents. The report indicates that if the incompleteness
11
of the 1967 data v;as random, the RTOR maneuver accidents
occurred, generally, at the more accident prone intersections,
Another point made in this report v/as that the severity in
accidents decreased after implementation of the RTOR
maneuver. The accident totals are shown in Table 2.
Several interesting points were made about the nature
of some accidents. Three accidents resulted when a right-
turning vehicle lured a through vehicle into the inter-
section. Two other accidents resulted from the cross
traffic traveling at an unsafe speed. The review of all
the different accidents failed to reveal a common inter-
section characteristic. Appropriate statistical tests
v;ero made and the following conclusions were drawn:
1. Direction of approach did not influence the
occurrence of RTOR accidents.
2. Although the difference was not significant,
approaches involving moderate to heavy pedestrian
volumes v\'ore relatively free of RTOR accidents.
This would indicate driver caution and/or less
RTOR maneuver use. The one RTOR accident in-
volving a pedestrian occurred at 0645 hours at
which time the pedestrian volume was extremely
light.
3. Approaches with moderate to heavy cross street
volumes had significantly more RTOR maneuver
accidents than did approaches with low cross
street volumes, probably due to higher exposure.
4. Although the difference was not significant,
high volume right turn approaches had relatively
more RTOR maneuver accidents, again probably
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5. There were significantly more RTOR maneuver
accidents at approaches with two lanes of
traffic from the left than with one lane. This
v/as probably due to heavier volumes on two lane
roadways.
6. Although the difference was not significant,
approaches with separate phase left turns and
where the cross street also had a separate left
turn phase had relatively fewer RTOR maneuver
accidents than did approaches without separate
phase left turns.
7. Approaches with usable right turn lanes had
significantly fewer RTOR maneuver accidents than
did those approaches without right turn lanes.
8. Although higher speed approaches had relatively
fev;er RTOR maneuver accidents, the difference
v;as not significant and may have been due to a
lower usage rate.
9. Four lane two-way roadway intersections with
four lane two-way roadways had significantly
more RTOR maneuver accidents, due probably to
higher volume exposure.
The following was considered to be a typical approach
where a RTOR maneuver accident occurred.
The intersection had:
1. less than 100 pedestrians crossing per day.
2. greater than 5,000 ADT on the cross street.
3. cross street traffic less than thirty-five raph.
4. more than 1,500 right turn vehicles per day.
5. two approach lanes with no exclusive right turn
lane
.
6. two lanes of traffic approaching from the left.
7. no left turn phase.
8. good sight distance.
14
Another study was conducted in Oklahoma City, Oklahoma
at approximately the same time (34) . The RTOR maneuver was
used at all four approaches at seventy-nine intersections
and at 225 approaches at other intersections. Again this
study was a before and after study. The after study was
conducted approximately one year after the signs were
installed. The major portion of the accident investigation
dealt with the seventy-nine intersections. Before the
installation of the signs, 798 accidents were reported at
tJicsG seventy-nine intersections. One year after the in-
stallation of the RTOR signs, 807 accidents were reported.
This increase of nine accidents represents an increase of
only 1.1 percent. During the same time period, the traffic
volume grew from 1,797,883 intersection crossings to
1,908,426, an increase of 6.15 percent. Considering inter-
section crossings as a measure of exposure to accident
probability, the accident rate v;as 4.7 percent less after
the RTOR maneuver installations than before. This report
seems to indicate that the RTOR maneuver does not increase
the overall accident problems at these intersections.
In a survey conducted by the city of Wichita, Kansas,
a wide range of opinions were reported (8). Of thirty-six
cities reporting, eighteen cities felt that the RTOR
maneuver created a pedestrian hazard and eighteen cities
felt that it did not create a pedestrian hazard. On the
question of vehicle hazards, only ten cities considered the
RTOR maneuver to be a hazard to vehicles while twenty-three
cities felt that it created no hazard. It should be under-
stood that tliese responses v;ere not necessarily based on
studies, but on the opinions of the individual replying
to the questionnaire.
15
Only one study reported an increase in accidents re-
sulting from the RTOR maneuver. From a study in Fort
Lauderdale, Florida, May (19) reported on accident ex-
perience at four intersections where the RTOR maneuver
v/as permitted by sign. Total accidents increased by
twenty-one percent at these intersections. Vehicle-vehicle
accidents increased from zero to seven. Vehicle-pedestrian
accidents increased from zero to five. A very interesting
result was that rear-end accidents decreased thirty-one
percent. Accidents involving RTOR vehicles accounted for
thirty-eight percent of the total.
It is seen that a variety of studies have examined the
effects of the RTOR maneuver on accidents. Almost every
study showed the RTOR maneuver accidents to be insignificant,
Many of the accident reports, when compared to traffic
volumes, showed that accident rates were not increased with
the implementation of the RTOR maneuver. In some reports
the accident rate actually decreased. In other reports
the RTOR maneuver v.'as proven to be no more dangerous than
right turn on green and in fact it may be safer.
Vehicle Delay and Travel Time Studies
Another area given some consideration is reduction of
both delay and travel time resulting from the use of the
RTOR maneuver. This basic reduction in delay v;ill be for
the time from v.'hen a vehicle can make a right turn while
facing a red signal until the signal turns green. Drivers
may be able to save additional time by being able to turn
without waiting for a pedestrian queue to dissipate as they
may have to do when they turn on green. Additional delay
reduction v;ill result from through or left turning vehicles
moving closer to the intersection on the red phase. It nay
be also possible that the RTOR maneuver will reduce the
16
travel time for a vehicle which can turn into the green
band in a progressive signal system.
Again, Ray's study (27) in the San Francisco Bay area
was one of the first to examine the delay and travel time
reduction resulting from the RTOR maneuver. The delay
reduction study was conducted at six different approaches
throughout the study area. These intersections had •
similar physical characteristics and were all controlled
by two phased fixed time controllers. Traffic volumes and
cycle lengths varied from intersection to intersection.
Delay reduction was measured as the time from when a vehicle
entered the intersection \intil the light turned green for
the same approach. These measurements were made for both
the off-peak and peak periods.
Attempts to establish a relationship between the time
saved and the length of the red phase of the signal cycle
gave a rank correlation coefficient of ,943 for the off-
peak period. For the peak period the rank correlation
coefficient was only .600 for these tv/o variables. This
seems to indicate that as the volumes increase, additional
variables influence the time savings. Figure 2 shows the
plot of these two variables for peak and off-peak periods.
The report stated that in all cases time v;as saved by the
RTOR vehicles, and in no instances was delay to any ether
vehicle or pedestrians at the intersection increased. The
conclusion was that the RTOR maneuver is justified in
terms of reduced delay for right turning vehicles.
To further evaluate reduced delay, travel time stuaies
were conducted over a course consisting of fourteen
signalized intersections. The vehicle was driven straight
through seven of the intersections and was turned right
at seven of the intersections. The trips were run witii
the driver alternately turning only on the green signal
and then on the red signal when it was safe to do so. The
17
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FIGURE 2. AVERAGE TIME SAVED PER RIGHT-TURN -ON
-
RED VEHICLE AS REPORTED BY JAMES RAV
(27) I
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vehicle traveled at the speed of traffic or the posted
speed limit. This process was conducted for both peak and
off-peak periods.
For the off peak period it was found that the average
travel time using the RTOR maneuver was .64 minutes less
than for right-turn-on-green. This is about a seven per-
cent savings. It should be noted that these trips were
run through the CBD. The actual stopped time was reduced
by sixty-eight percent at right turn intersections. The
travel time delay reduction was greater for the peak
period. Travel time v;as reduced 1.11 minutes or about ten
percent. The difference in travel time is significant to
the ninety-five percent confidence level. For both peak
and off-peak periods the running times were not significantly
reduced with the use of the RTOR maneuver. This study
seems to demonstrate that the delay reduction occurs
almost totally at right turn locations. Table 3 shows the
results of the travel tim.e study.
The study also made an attempt to measure the affect
of pedestrians on vehicular delay. Pedestrian delay for
right-turn-on-green vehicles results from pedestrians
crossing directly to the right of the approach to the
intersection. At no time, however, in the study was a
vehicle turning right on green forced to wait through the
next red phase. The thirty-two vehicles delayed by
pedestrians while turning right during the green phase had
an average pedestrian delay of .08 minute per vehicle.
Some vehicles making a RTOR maneuver v;ere also delayed by
pedestrians crossing in front of them. The seventeen
vehicles so delayed by pedestrians while performing a RTOP.
maneuver had an average pedestrian delay of .06 minutes
per vehicle. This difference of .02 minutes per vehicle
did not prove to be significant to the ninety-eight percent
confidence level. Delays v/ere measured during both the
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The study conducted by the Minnesota Highway Depart-
ment (30) also examined the effects on delay resulting from
the RTOR maneuver. Ten approaches at seven intersections
were used in the delay study; five of the intersections
had traffic actuated signals. A before and after technique
was used. The delay was measured as the time from when a
vehicle stopped ur.til it completed its right turn. The
study indicated that v;hile some drivers apparently did
not see the signs, an appreciable reduction in delay to
right turning vehicles resulted from the use of the RTCR
maneuver. The delay for RTOR vehicles was 11.44 seconds
less on the average, which is approximately a forty-seven
percent delay reduction. This reduction was approximately
the same for peak and off peak periods as well as for
fixed time and traffic actuated signals. Delays from the
study are shown in Table 4
.
William H. Van Gelder conducted a study in Nev/ York
(38) similar to the Ray study. He used a rectangular
course making right turns at three traffic signals. Van
Gelder, like Ray, came to the conclusion that the RTOR
maneuver has no effect on running time, but he indicated
a substantial reduction in travel time over the prescribed
course. An average delay reduction of fifteen seconds
was reported for off-peak periods in this study, but no
value v;as reported for peak periods.
Another study conducted in Colorado was reported by
Scott (30). In his study he attempted to correlate delay
v;ith length of the red phase, RTOR volume, right turn
volumes and volume of conflicting cross street traffic.
Due primarily to his data sample size no correlation was
found. Delay reduction varied from a low of 9.7 seconds
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In a report of experiences with the RTOR maneuver in
I'innesota (36) it v/as indicated that in certain situations
the cross traffic could be subjected to unnecessary delay.
In a rural situation vr/ith an actuated signal on a minor
cross street, a RTOR maneuver vehicle could register a
call, but by the time the green signal is given to the
side street the vehicle will already be gone as a result
of the RTOR maneuver. If any vehicle approaches during
this time on the main street, it will have to wait through
the red phase although no vehicle is traveling from the
side street. However, it should be noted that without the
RTOR maneuver, the vehicle on the side street v/ould have
to v;ait for the green signal and the vehicle on the main
street would have to wait for the vehicle on the side
street. By looking at it in this manner, it is seen that
the side street vehicle delay is reduced with the use of
the RTOR maneuver and the main street delay is not changed.
If a presence detector is used at the intersection on the
side street the call may not be registered when a vehicle
makes a RTOR, and the delay may be reduced for both streets,
Gap Availability
The availability of gaps in the cross traffic has been
given very little attention in the past. A gap in the
pedestrians crossing in front of the right turning vehicle
must also be found, and it must coincide with the gap in
traffic. No one has thoroughly examined the problem of
pedestrian gaps.
In a study conducted by Betz, Bauman , and others at
Arizona State University (2), it v/as determined that a gap
of six seconds is the minimum acceptable gap for a right
turn maneuver into a street with a speed limit of thirty-
five miles per hour. At least eighty-five percent of all
right turning vehicles rejected a gap of less than six
24
seconds. Therefore, the gap acceptance for the PTOP.
maneuver is nearly always large enough so that the cross
traffic is not forced to slow down. The study also found
that there is no difference in the gap acceptance for
right turning vehicles and vehicles 'tutning left onto a
one-way street. Both in-state and out-of-state drivers
accepted about the same size gaps.
William G. Van Gelder (38) conducted a similar study
in Seattle, Washington and in New York. In this study, he
averaged rejected gaps and accepted gaps and determined
an acceptable gap as being midway between the average
rejected and average accepted gap. In Seattle, the average
minimum acceptable gap was determined to be 4.25 seconds.
In New York, the average minimum acceptable gap v;as
determined to be 4.30 seconds. It was concluded that the
minimum acceptable gap is approximately the same for both
east and west coast drivers, and that their aggressiveness
is approximately the same.
In their book Traffic Engineering , Matson , Smith and
Hurd (18) reported that when a merging vehicle is
stationary or moving at a slow speed prior to the act of
merging, and accordingly a high relative different speed
existed, the majority of drivers rejected gaps of less
than 5.5 seconds but accepted gaps greater than six seconds.
When gaps of less than five seconds were accepted, the
rear vehicle forming the gap was usually retarded.
Solberg and Oppenlander reported on a study of lag
and gap acceptance in Indiana (33) . They examined four
intersections to determine driver gap acceptance
characteristics at stop controlled intersections. They
came to the conclusion that the median acceptance times
for right-turn movements was 7.36 seconds. They found that
there was no significant difference betv;ccn the median
lag-acceptance and the median gap acceptance at these
25
intersections. Also, they found that drivers in a small
community required larger gaps than drivers in a large
community.
No one has become very deeply concerned v/ith the
question of gaps in the pedestrian traffic. Only Ray has
commented on this concept (27) . In his study he found
that sufficient gaps existed in both parallel and transverse
pedestrian traffic to permit the desired right turning
movement v;ithin the phase.
Capacity and Level of Service
The next area given consideration is capacity and
level of service. No actual field studies have been con-
ducted in this area; however. Van Gelder has developed a
theoretical technique for determining the maximum RTOR
maneuver volumes for given cross traffic volumes (38).
It was determined that the first six vehicles in a queue
have an average headway of less than four seconds, and the
following vehicles have headways of two to three seconds.
The RTOR maneuver must occur at the end of the queue since
no acceptable gap will occur in the queue. The amount of
time available for RTOR after the queue has cleared is
dependent on volume, cycle length and cycle split. The
time required for a queue to clear is calculated by the
formula:
X
C = (2.1 nR + H) [E (2.1 n)^]
^ o
n = -, -
.^
= Average number of arrivals per second.
Q = Vehicles per hour.
R = Main street red in seconds.
G = Main street green in seconds.
C = Total time to clear queue.
H =3.7 for nR=5 or more.
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The time available for the RTOR maneuver is determined
by subtracting the length of time to clear the queue from
the total main-street green time. The gaps during the
remaining time will approximate a Poisson distribution.
The maximum number of RTOR maneuvers is then dependent on
the number of gaps and the maximum right turns into these
gaps. As the main street volume decreases, the time for
the RTOR maneuver increases. Also, as the average number
of main street arrivals decreases, the number of gaps de-
creases, tlowever, these gaps will be capable of handling
more right turning vehicles.
It was assumed by Van Gelder that since all vehicles
are required to stop before making the right turn, the
departure headway will be a constant. rio field study has
been perform.ed to absolutely determine the headv;ay, but
a value of 4.3 seconds was assumed for purposes of
simplifying calculations.
An additional equation was derived by Van Gelder to
take into consideration the possibility of multiple entries
into a single gap. The total capacity was calculated
using the number of gaps and the average arrival rate of
main street vehicles. This capacity was calculated from
the probable number of gaps occurring v;hich were of
sufficient size to handle one vehicle, two vehicles, three
vehicles, etc.
Total capacity = Z x N (e"''''''^-e
^^'^'
"^) = Nz!" e"'''^^
o '•
N = n (G-C ) = Average arrivals in (G-C ) seconds
"^ q
n = Ilain-Gtreet average arrival rate
t = 4.3 seconds
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Using this formula v;ith a ninety second cycle, sixty
second main street and thirty second side street. Figure
3 is an example of the RTOR maneuver capacity. Tb.is
Figure represents the maximum number of RTOR maneuvers
possible when a continuous queue of right turning vehicles
is present. The points plotted are actual observations.
Of these points, seventy-tv/o percent are within the
capacity range established. The author speculated that
the observations falling outside of the limits resulted
from drivers not stopping before performing the maneuver
which gave them a shorter headv;ay than theorized and
that the main street drivers had less than a 2.1 second
headway at this high volume. The dashed vertical line
represents the minimum possible number of RTOR maneuvers
resulting from vehicles turning at the end of the queue.
The line represents two vehicles per cycle.
From these calculations it appears that the RTOR
maneuver volumes are a function of main street traffic,
percent of red time for the side street, and the availability
of right-turning vehicles.
Capacity is defined as "the maximum number of vehicles
which has a reasonable expectation of passing over a given
section of a lane or a roadway in one direction during a
given time period under prevailing roadway and traffic
conditions " (10) . Capacity is, therefore, level of service
E, and it is not logical to assume that more vhicles can
be placed in the main street if it is operating at
capacity or level of service F. The RTOR maneuver v.'ill
not increase the capacity of the intersection, assuming
the signal is properly timed. However, as the volume on
the main street declines, the number of RTOR maneuvers can
increase. As this number increases, the level of service
for the side street and perhaps the entire intersection can
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The only other coirunent concerning the effects of the
RTOR maneuver on volumes was by Smith. He said
"Assuming the average red time to be 30
seconds and assuming that each vehicle comes
to a full stop at the stop-bar, only four or
five vehicles at best will mal;e the turn on
the red phase. This is scarcely enough to
warrant the permissive (permission by rule)
regulation" (32)
.
Using this example it can be shown that a substantial
number of right-turning vehicles can move through the
intersection on the red phase. If four or five vehicles
can turn, an additional 240 or 300 vehicles could move
through the intersection. As discussed earlier the
capacity of the intersection would not be any larger, but
the level of service of the approach allowing the maneuver
could be improved with an increase of volume of this
magnitude
.
Ray (27) has demonstrated that the percentage of
right-turning vehicles which can turn right on red remained
constant for both peak and off-peak periods. He found
this to be eighteen percent of the total right-turning
vehicles. This volume ranged from tv;o to thirty-seven
percent of the total volume. The results of his study are
sho\^n in Table 5.
Warrants and Intersection Characteristics
Wliile the RTOR memeuver has existed for over thirty
years no individual or organization has developed a set
of warrants for the use of the maneuver based on a good
thorough investigation of the effects of the RTOR maneuver.
Perhaps the most scientific investigation was conducted
by the Minnesota Highway Departm.ent (36). This study was
designed primarily to determine the relationship betv;een
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accident experience constitutes one of the greatest ob-
jections to the RTOR maneuver, it v/ould seem that using
the maneuver where accident experience has been good v;ould
be one of the best warrants. I«7hile many of the findings
were not statistically significant, they are a good guide
for using or not using the maneuver. The findings are
listed in the accident discussion section of this report.
When Smith (32) began his study on the RTOR maneuver
in Colorado Springs, Colorado, he also established a set
of warrants for the use of the maneuver. These warrants
were contained in the study report and are also listed in
the accident discussion section of this report. These
warrants appear to be very arbitrary, and with the exception
of the first warrant, they are very subjective.
Larry Erion (6) agreed with a study conducted in
Wichita, Kansas (8) with regard to warrants for the RTOR
maneuver. They both agreed that the following conditions
should be met for use of the maneuver:
1. A large right turn volume should exist.
2. A low pedestrian volume should exist.
3. A low cross street vehicular speed should exist.
4. An exclusive right-turn lane should exist.
Wichita, Kansas added two more requirements for use of the
maneuver:
1. A low cross street volume should exist.
2. An adequate sight distance should exist.
Similarly, Oklahoma City, Oklahoma (34) arbitrarily
established v;arrants for the implementation of the RTOR
maneuver at their study intersections. However, their
warrants were all negative. The RTOR maneuver should not
be permitted at:
1. CBD intersections where pedestrian activity
is the greatest.
2. Intersections with restricted sight distance.
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3. Intersections with critical signal off-sets.
4. Intersections with more than four approaches.
5. Intersections with left turn signals on the
opposing approach requiring a merge with a P.TOR
vehicle into a single lane.
6. Intersections in school zones.
Mathison (17) reported on positive warrants for the
use of the RTOR maneuver. The RTOR maneuver should be
used where
:
1. There is a separate right turn lane.
2. There are two lanes departing the intersection
to the right.
3. There is adequate sight distance.
4. There is advance notice that the curb lane
is a right-tum-only lane.
The Indiana State Highway Commission (14) has developed
a more extensive list of criteria for not using the RTOR
maneuver. The intersection characteristics which suggest
the maneuver should not be permitted are:
1. CBD area with high pedestrian volumes.
2. Signals used by school children.
3. Approaches with only one approach leine.
4. Approaches with cross street volximes high
enough to have no gaps available for safely
performing the maneuver.
5. High speed rural intersections.
6. Intersections with heavy truck movements.
7. Multi-legged intersections where the turn can
be made into or from more than one approach leg.
8. Intersections with restricted sight distance.
9. Intersections where other protected movements
are permitted under separate arrow indications.
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In the study conducted by Ray (27) questionnaires v;ere
sent to cities and states throughout the country. The
results of this questionnaire indicated that v/arrants
similar to the above were used throughout the United States.
The following list of x^;arrants for using the RTOR maneuver
was compiled from the cities in the eastern part of the
country:
1. . Intersections with light pedestrian traffic.
2. Where intersection geometries permit essentially
a merging maneuver.
3. ViJhere right turn volume is so heavy that it
cannot be accommodated on the green phase.
4. V^ere the pedestrian volume is less than
forty pedestrians per hour on the affected
crosswalk.
The warrants for use of the RTOR maneuver from the
western part of the country were compiled into the following
list:
1. Prohibited in the CBD.
2. Right turning volume which is too large to
accommodate during the green phase.
3. No serious pedestrian conflict.
4. Sufficient street space to have an only-right-
turn lane.
5. No serious vehicle conflict.
6. Separate left turn signals for the cross
street must be accompanied by right turn in-
dications.
From this sampling of warrants, it is clear that almost
all of them are arbitrary. The majority of the warrants
are also very subjective. As a result of this subjectivity
it would be very difficult, if not impossible to implement
the RTOR maneuver in a uniform manner throughout the country
with these warrants.
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In 1972, the state of Minnesota began permitting the
RTOR maneuver at all signalized intersections unless pro-
hibited by a sign. A report in the North Central ITE
Bulletin (16) gave some indication of the warrants used
for prohibition of the maneuver. The Minnesota Highv/ay
Department felt there was no need for widespread pro-
hibition of the maneuver. Their approach v;as to prohibit
the maneuver only where, in their judgment, the maneuver
would be extremely hazardous. The city of St. Paul, had
installed no prohibitions at the time of the report.
However, they were carefully watching multi-leg inter-
sections. Such locations are where the first problems
were anticipated.
The city of Minneapolis took a similar approach. They
decided to prohibit the RTOR maneuver at established school
crossings at signalized intersections, since they felt that
elementary school children need all of the protection they
could get. Hennepin County officials also felt that
problems would be found at school crossings and in
pedestrian areas with the RTOR maneuver. In general,
traffic officials in the St. Paul - Minneapolis area have
permitted the RTOR maneuver almost everyv;here, and found
little need to prohibit the maneuver anywhere by the time
of the report.
This report on experiences in Minnesota (16) indicates
that a different approach to use of the RTOR maneuver has
been taken. No need has been found for arbitrary warrants
for banning the RTOR maneuver. From the report, it can
only be concluded that the widespread use of the permissive
maneuver is working quite successfully.
Summary
In reviewing the literature it is obvious that
attitudes about the RTOR maneuver are rapidly changing
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throughout the country. Many states which had completely
prohibited the maneuver are now permitting it in some
select locations. Other states which only allowed the
RTOR maneuver at select locations are now or will soon be
allowing it under a permissive law. The result will be
much confusion for the driver as he travels from one state
to another. Some local agencies even require special
signs, green arrows, red arrows, etc., and in some
situations these do not conform to the appropriate state
law. The feelings about the RTOR maneuver are highly
polarized in this country with the east coast being
opposed to it and the west coast in favor of it.
The area given the most consideration in the literature
has been accident analysis. Almost all of the reports have
come to the conclusion that the RTOR maneuver accidents
are a very small portion of the total accident experience.
Some reports even indicate that the RTOR maneuver may be
safer than right turn on green. It also appears that
pedestrians may be safer with the RTOR maneuver than with
right turn on green. Only one study by May (19) reported
any bad accident experience with the maneuver.
Another area given a lot of consideration in the
literature is delay reduction resulting from the RTOR
maneuver. It was found in several studies that delay to
right truning vehicles was reduced without increasing the
delay for any other vehicles at the intersection. Also,
it was found that travel time over a prescribed course
which included a right turn was reduced. This delay re-
duction varied from 2 0.1 seconds to 9.7 seconds saved per
right truning vehicle. It was also determined that the
presence or number of pedestrians had no real effect on
the amount of time saved with the use of the RTOR maneuver.
Attempts were made to correlate the decreased delay with
intersection characteristics. The R^ values considered
good enough to be reported ranged from .60 to .94.
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An area of importance which has not been given much
consideration to date is gap availability. Most of the
literature dealing with gaps concerned itself v;ith the
size of gap v/hich would be accepted for a RTOR maneuver.
The size of reported acceptable gaps for right turning
vehicles ranged from a minimum of 4.25 seconds to a median
of 7.36 seconds. It was also found that adequate acceptable
gaps generally exist in pedestrian traffic for right
turning vehicles
.
The only real examination of the effects of the RTOR
maneuver on capacity v;as performed by Van Gelder (38). On
a purely theoretical basis an equation was developed to
determine the capacity increase resulting from the m.aneuver.
TliG equation was based on the assumptions that the traffic
must stop before making the right turn and that a continuous
queue of right turning vehicles is present. When the
equation was tested with field data, it was found that it
provided a reasonable estimate of the maximum limit of RTOR
maneuver volumes. It was found that the use of the RTOR
maneuver did not increase the capacity of an intersection,
but that it could improve the level of service of the
approach v;hen the cross street was not operating at capacity.
The final area reviewed was warrants and intersection
characteristics. It appears that a variety of warrants have
been used throughout the country. Almost all of these
warrants are very arbitrary, and the application of them
has been very subjective. In the Minnesota Highway Depart-
ment study (36) intersection characteristics v;here accidents
are likely to occur were identified. These characteristics
could easily be used as warrants, and they are probably
the most scientifically developed set available. Some
cities in Minnesota (16), however, reported a different
approach to the problem. They simply were only prohibiting
the maneuver, under their new permissive law, at locations
where specific problems arise. At the time of the report
officials seemed to feel that the system was working quite
well and very few locations had been found where it v;as
necessary to prohibit the RTOR maneuver.
One warrant which generally is accepted as desirable
for locations where the RTOR maneuver should not be per-
mitted is concerned with sight distance. Inherent v;ith
sight distance and the RTOR maneuver is the fact that an
acceptable gap for the maneuver must be visible if the
movement is to be made safely. Some of the best v;ork
performed on gap acceptance has been done by Solberg and
Oppenlander (33) . They came to the conclusion that the
median acceptable gap for a right turning vehicle is
approximately 7.36 seconds. Using this value, Table 6
was derived which gives the sight distances required to
allov; a driver to be able to see far enough to select an
acceptable gap. The sight distance from Table 6 should
be available before the RTOR maneuver is permitted. This
sight distance should be provided such that a driver has
a clear line of sight for the distance when he has his
vehicle properly stopped behind the stop-line. By providing
this siglit distance, the problem of vehicles encroaching
on the crosswalk should be minimized.
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Table 6. Recommended Sight Distance Requirements for RTOR
Minimum Sight Distance









CHAPTER 3. DESIGN OF THE STUDY
Techniques Used in the Study
In an attempt to establish warrants for the RTOR
maneuver or to gain some understanding of the benefits that
could result from the maneuver, it seemed appropriate to
measure the changes in levels of various intersection
characteristics. Initially it was decided that it would
be important to know how the accident experience might
change, how vehicle and pedestrian delay v;ould be affected
and how volume of vehicles at these intersection approaches
m>ight be changed.
With these ideas in mind, a study was designed to
determine intersection characteristics v/hich could be easily
measured before the maneuver was implemented, and which
would be good indicators of what changes would occur in the
above characteristics. A before and after technique was
used for measuring these changes. The before study was
used to examine en approach leg of an intersection as if it
were being considered for the implementation of the maneuver,
A RTOR sign v;as then installed at this location. After a
one month period the approach was again examined to measure
any changes which had occurred. The one month time period
was decided upon simply to work within the time restraints
of the project. It would have been desirable to allow a
longer time period, perhaps one year, before the after
study.
The variables measured in the determination of the




1. Number of phases per signal
cycle
2. Length of red phase
3. Length of cycle
4. Nature of cross traffic
flow upstream
5. Speed of cross traffic
upstream
6. Speed of approach traffic
7. Volume of cross traffic
upstream
8. Volume of approach traffic
9. Volume of pedestrians
crossing approach street
10. Number of through lanes
of cross traffic upstream
11. Percent of turning movements
of cross traffic upstream
12. Number of approach lanes
13. Availability of right turn
only lane
14. Percent of right turn
approach volume
15. Width of approach street
16. Number of cross traffic
lanes dov;n stream
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Manual count of each
type of delay occurrence
Moving car technique
Manual count of critical
incident occurrences
The nature of the cross traffic flow upstream refers
to the presence of a progressive signal system, local fixed
time signal, stop sign, yield sign, or no control on the
cross street upstream from the study approach. It was felt
that the nature of this control v;ould affect the arrival on
the cross street which would control the availability of
gaps for the right turning vehicle. The number of approach
lanes v;as recorded as the number of lanes used by vehicles
as opposed to the number of lanes marked at the location.
This practice is in accordance with the recommendations of
the Highway Capacity Manual (10) in the measurement of
intersection capacity. It was felt that the width of the
approach street might be important because it controls the
length of time pedestrians could be in conflict with a
vehicle turning right against the red signal. The number
of cross traffic lanes downstream from the study approach
v.'as recorded because it determines the number of different
maneuvers possible into the cross traffic.
All of the measurements were taken on a per hour basis
except for the twenty-four hour counts. Each intersection
was studied for four hours including both peak and non-pea>:
periods during both the before and after studies. Attempts
were made to conduct both the before and after study on the
same day of the week and same hours of the day to help
remove any variance due to normal changes in traffic patterns
from hour to hour or day to day.
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The dependent variables consisted of pedestrian delay,
delay savings to vehicles, accident potential and volume
changes. Pedestrian delay was divided into three types of
delay: pedestrians prevented from leaving the curb,
pedestrians forced to return to the curb, and pedestrians
forced to v;ait in the middle of the street. Occurrences
of each type of delay resulting from a right turning vehicle
were recorded. The before study recorded pedestrian delay
resulting from right turn on green vehicles. The after
study recorded all pedestrian delay resulting from any
right turning vehicle. The change in pedestrian delay was
then used as the dependent variable.
A moving car technique was used to measure vehicle
delay savings. A vehicle was driven through the inter-
section making a right turn from the study approach. Before
entering the intersection a stop watch was started at a
predetermined reference point. After traveling through
the intersection, the stop watch was stopped at a second
predetermined reference point. These reference points were
selected in an arbitrary manner, but attempts were made to
select points located where the vehicle had not started to
slow down as it approached the intersection or was not still
accelerating as it came away from the intersection. In the
before study, all turns were made against a green signal.
In the after study, the turns were made as soon as they
could be made safely. Ten runs were made each hour in both
the before and after studies. In an attempt to approach
the intersection in a random fashion, a random period of
delay was taken between each run. A number was selected
from a random number table. The last two digits of this
number were then used as a percentage. This percentage of
the cycle length was used as the random delay between travel
time measurements. The ten runs were averaged and the
difference between the before and after averages was taken
to be the average delay reduction resulting from the RTOR
maneuver.-
43
The measurement of the effect of the RTOR maneuver on
accident experience proved to be more difficult. A technique
has been developed by Perkins (24) and evaluated by Baker
(1) which will correlate the number of accidents to the
number of conflicts. Since it v/as anticipated that accidents
would be very few or none, a conflict technique was used
to measure accident potential. Perkins and Harris (24) and
Hayward (9) both developed techniques for measuring these
conflicts. Since every driver must evaluate many potential
conflicts, it is suggested by Hayward (9) that an individual
driver can by observation determine critical incidents. A
critical incident method was used to measure accident
potential for this study. The observer simply counted and
recorded all defensive maneuvers by drivers, such as a
swerve or severe hard braking, which he felt resulted from
the driver attempting to avoid an accident. The count of
these critical maneuvers, or accident potential, was
recorded for both the before and after studies. The intent
was to use the difference in these numbers, with the
appropriate traffic volumes taken into consideration, as
the relative change in accident expectation resulting from
the RTOR maneuver.
An attempt v/as also made to measure driver irritation
resulting from the RTOR maneuver. It was felt that some
drivers would display irritation v.'hen they v/ere not able
to make a right turn, because the vehicle in front of then
was in their way. This measurement was recorded as the
number of occurrences of any display of irritation such as
drivers sounding their horns.
Before the study was begun, it was decided that some
measure of driver's acceptance was required. Therefore it
was decided that the number of situations where a vehicle
desiring to make a right-turn and having the opportunity to
make it were counted and recorded. Also, the number of
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vehicles which then performed the RTOR maneuver v;ere counted
and recorded. These measurements permitted the calculation
of the percent of drivers who made a RTOR maneuver when
given the opportunity.
Selection of Lafayette Study Intersections
For the Lafayette study four intersections were
selected. The first selected was the intersection of Main
Street and Sixth Street. This intersection was selected
primarily because it is near the CBD and has relatively
high pedestrian vol\imes. As a result of one-way street
operation only two approaches were used.
The intersection of Ninth Street and Ferry Street was
also selected because it was near the CBD. During the peak
period this intersection had high volumes of vehicles. It
v;as also expected that some pedestrians would be present at
this intersection during the study period. All four
approaches v;ere used for the study.
Another intersection used in the study was Eighteenth
Street and Union Street. This intersection had a right-
turn-only lane. High vehicular volumes were anticipated
here and this intersection is larger than any other in the
Lafayette study. Since Union Street is also a one-v;ay
street, only two approaches were used.
The final intersection used in the study was Kossuth
Street and Sixteenth Street. This intersection v/as
selected because of its extremely low volumes. The traffic
signal located there is probably not warranted. All four
approaches were used.
The twelve approaches at these four intersections ware
studied for four one hour periods before and after erection
of RTOR signs. The four hour periods were either from
7:00 A.M. to 11:00 A.M. or 2:00 P.M. to 6:00 P.M.
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Beginning in May, 19 73, the data were taken for the
before study. On June 27, 1973 the RTOR signs were installed.
After the sians had been installed for a minimum of a one
month period and the motoring public had an opportunity to
become accustomed to the maneuver at these locations , the
data were taken for the after study.
Study of Existing RTOR Intersections
Another study of RTOR vehicle effects was made at
intersections in Indianapolis. In late 196 8 the City of
Indianapolis, Indiana installed signs permitting the RTOR
maneuver at a large variety of intersections under their
jurisdiction. Since the maneuver had been permitted there
for approximately five years and the motoring public had a
good opportunity to become accustomed to it, these inter-
sections were used in this study. tlo specific number of
intersections was dictated for the study. Instead it was
decided that as many intersection approaches as possible
with a variety of characteristics should be examined.
Again, the intersections were selected so as to possess
certain characteristics. One of the first considerations
v;as the volumes on the street crossing the approach permitting
the RTOR maneuver. Attempts v;ere made to utilize some
intersections near the CBD. These intersections had
relatively high volumes during peak periods and as a result
of being near the CBD, they also had large pedestrian
volumes. 7m attempt was also made to select intersectioas
in outlying areas v;hich would have a wide range of volumes
during the study period. The approach intersections to be
studied were limited to the ones with only one or two
through lanes from the left on the cross street. Observacion
of approaches v;ith more than two through lanes from t.ie left
on the cross street showed that drivers only required that
the first two lanes be free of vehicles before they v;ould
attempt a RTOR maneuver.
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At each of the selected approaches, a four hour study
v/as made of pedestrian delay, accident potential, RTOR
maneuver opportunities and use, and driver irritation. The
data collected as measures of each of these factors were
the same as for the before and after study in Lafayette
except for pedestrian delay and accident potential. Rather
than using the change in pedestrian delay occurrences by
type, it became necessary (because of no before study) to
simply use the number of pedestrian delay occurrences by
type resulting from a RTOR maneuver. Rather than using
the change in accident potential occurrences, it likev;iGa
became necessary to use the number of accident potential
occurrences resulting from a RTOR maneuver.
It v;as further decided that a nev/ dependent variable
should be considered in the study, the number of gaps in
the cross traffic as they could be an important consideration
for the RTOR maneuver. The number of gaps was measured by
observation at each site. One gap was counted and recorded
each time a gap large enough for a vehicle to make a right
turn v/as observed. If the gap was large enough for more
than one vehicle to turn, the number of vehicles which
could have turned into the gap in the cross traffic was
recorded.
A need for a further refinement in the data collection
technique was found during the Lafayette study. It was
found that a one hour sample period tended to obscure
affects of peak flows. Often a peak flow condition would
not exist for a full hour or it would not coincide with a
clock hour v/hich v;as the basis for the data collection. In
an attempt to record data better during periods of peak
flow, data were collected and recorded for one half hour
periods. In retrospect, it may have been better if time
periods had been fifteen or twenty minutes so as to better
measure the effects of higher volumes.
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The data collection for the Indianapolis study was be-
gun in September, 1973. Thirty-six intersection approaches
were examined for the study. These intersection approaches
are listed in Appendix A. The data collection was completed
in October, 1973.
While the intersection characteristics data were being
collected, the information required for the accident
analysis was also sought. Attempts were made to get the
accident records from 1967 through 1970 for each of the
selected RTOR maneuver intersections. However, the accident
records for this time period were in storage. The only
records readily available for this period were collision
diagrams, and the only ones available were for intersections
with high accident experience. Furthermore, it was impossible
to determine from the diagrams which, if any, accidents
resulted from a RTOR maneuver.
As a result of this situation, it was decided to per-
form an accident analysis on any RTOR maneuver intersection
in Indianapolis where collision diagrams or accident totals
were available for the before period (1967-68) and the after
period (1969-70) . Accident totals were also found for some
RTOR maneuver intersections for the years 1968 (before) and
1969 (after) . These data were also used. The list of RTOR
intersections used for the accident analysis portion of this
study is found in Appendix B. It should be noted that not
every approach to each RTOR maneuver intersection included
in this analysis permitted the RTOR maneuver.
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CHAPTER 4. ANALYSIS
The discussion of the analysis will be approached in
a manner similar to the reviev; of literature. The analysis
will be divided into several different items to be examined.
The first area to be examined will be the accident analysis.
In a similar manner, the number of drivers and percentage
of drivers using the RTOR maneuver, the delay change,
displays of driver irritation, pedestrian delay change, and
the availability of gaps will be examined.
Accidents
The accident analysis can again be broken into three
categories. The first category to be examined is the
change in accident potential resulting from the implementation
of the RTOR maneuver. The second category to be examined
is the accident records from fifty-four intersections in
Indianapolis, Indiana. The third and final category is
the accident records from the four intersections used in
the Lafayette study.
Accident Potential Change
As described in the Design of the Study, an attempt
was made to measure accident potential. In the Lafayette
study, the accident potential was measured for the entire
intersection during both before and after. The value
being measured v/as the change in the accident potential.
In the Indianapolis study only accident potential directly
connected to a RTOR maneuver was recorded.
The data on accident potential recorded in the before
and after studies in Lafayette were so meager as to be of
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little value in evaluating safety of the RTOR maneuver.
During the before study, only three critical incidents
were recorded at the four intersections during the sixteen
hours of study. In the after study only one critical
incident was recorded for the same time and it did not
involve a RTOR maneuver.
In the Indianapolis study where only critical incidents
involving RTOR maneuver vehicles were recorded, only four
such incidents in seventy-six hours were noted.
The values obtained were too few to permit a meaningful
analysis except for the observation that the RTOR maneuver
did not appear to cause any important changes in safety
at the intersections studied.
Existing RTOR Maneuver Intersection
Accident Study (Indianapolis)
The accident information at RTOR maneuver intersections
in Indianapolis was broken down into the categories of
personal injury, property damage, and pedestrians. To
suppliment the list of accident numbers compiled in this
manner, the total nximber of accidents was available for
some other intersections. The list of intersections and
the number of accidents by type or total are shown in
Appendix B.
To analyze this data, the niamber of accidents before
the signs were erected were compared to the number of
accidents after the installation of the RTOR maneuver signs.
It is desirable to utilize the "Student's" t-test in an
attempt to determine if more accidents occurred after the
signs were installed than before the signs were installed.
To properly utilize the "Student's" t-test the data being
tested must have a normal distribution. The Shapiro-Wilk
test was employed to test the normality of the data. Table 7
shows the personal injury accidents, both before and after,
































in V£> <U OJ in (0
-P 00 ^ CN CO 0) •p Q)
c • fO 1 4-> >-lo 0) o 01 4-1
r~ 13 cn J-l +J ^ 4-1
a^ •H r~- r^ o r^ II -P u (/5 r rH
.H U ^ C 0) 0) cn •H G
1 U (Tl m 0) t3 +J - s o
r- < • <-{ T3 1 p 1 -H
\o r^ (y\ rsi O » H 0) -p c 4-) 4-1
a\ IW 1 in u x: <u UJ u U
r-i II o U +j r Ti 0) •H Q)
• (C CO 3 4J a m
(0 M r-i m (N S S IW - -p (0 MP 0) 1 M-( o -p CO A^ j=; (U
(0 X5 c r <-{ CO 4-1
Q 6 c 0) •H c
3 in r- <N u (0 Ti (U S (U •H
+J 3 1 CD 0) 3 ^ 1 x;
C XJ e -p 4-) -p >i
<U 00 e cn u XI
na ro U3 n r- 13 0) : !-l H MH 1 • C x: di T)
o r-l -p <U 4-1 n3 1+-I 0)
CJ II CJ -C x: P •
< CN <D ^ ^ ^ U-\ p 0) CO 0) ^4 -—
1 in (N P 3 13 O o
>1 • iH M M S-l r-H ar-
M o » c c O (0 (0 QJ 1
d o in in in H IW > U-l > U CTi
•n 1 II cr\ •w >X)
C • 0) -p 0) 4J QJ s 0) CTiH +J P M ro 13 3 J-l rH
(N 00 kD (t3 •H iH i-\ rH rH fO ^
iH t-\ iH 1 0) > (0 (0 CO to
(0 !-l 0) > U > o in >-i
c U ^ •H -rH 4J (U
0) -P 4-> s 4-1 C 4J
CO n3 13 -H -H d) 4H
M M TJ S-l Ti J-l 'a (0
0) (U n3 0) U 0) U •H
CU Di -a -P 4J O 13
OJ fO c 13 II D II U C
• (U ^ o S-i (fl a a <C (0
r^ W LO • 0) -U e (N E ro
(U (d iH > C/2 o M o iH
(U U >-i Q) o <: u o ^ • •
iH 0) U II II in in (1)
Xi M-l 4-1 O II II II a^ II o 4-)
rO QJ U-t OJ IQ IQ . •
Eh OQ < Q IQ to IQ Ul -p 4-1 s S 2
51
both two years before and tv;o years after. The critical W
value for thirteen observations and alpha equal to .05 is
W^Q5 12 ~ 0.866. Since the computed W value is W = 0.947, the
hypothesis of normality can not be rejected, and it is con-
cluded that the data has a normal distribution. The t value
for "Student's" t-test for twelve degrees of freedom and
alpha equal to .05, is not in the critical region, and the null
hypothesis that there is no difference in the accident
experience before and after the installation of the RTOR
maneuver sign could not be rejected. It should be noted,
however, that there were more accidents in the two year
after period than in the two year before period.
Table 8 shows the property damage accident experience
for the same four year period. Again a Shapiro-Wilk test
was used and the hypothesis of normality could not be
rejected. Also a "Student's" t-test was performed on the
data, and again the null hypothesis that there was no dif-
ference in the property damage accident experience before
and after the installation of the RTOR maneuver signs could
not be rejected. It should be noted here that there were
less property damage accidents in the two year after period
than in the two year before period.
The same procedure was followed to examine the pedestrian
accident experience. Table 9 shows the number of pedestrian
accidents at these same intersections. The Shapiro-Wilk test
was employed again. However, the hypothesis of normality was
rejected. Several transformations, square root, logarithm,
inverse, etc., were utilized, but all of them failed to
normalize the data. As a result of the nature of the data
no statistical tests can be performed on the data. It can
only be noted that there were four more pedestrian accidents
in the after period than in the before period.
Since accident information for the total number of acci-
dents was available for seven additional intersections for the
appropriate four year period, a Shapiro-Wilk test and a
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The data for the intersections are tabulated in Table 10. The
hypothesis of normality could not be rejected, and it was con-
cluded that the data is normally distrubuted. The null hypoth-
esis that there was no difference in the total number of acci-
dents during the two year period after the RTOR maneuver
signs were installed and the two year period before the signs
were installed could not be rejected since the computed t
value is not in the critical region. However, if an alpha
value of .10 is used, the computed t value falls in the
critical region, and the null hypothesis could be rejected.
It is then probable that the total number of accidents
decreased after the RTOR maneuver signs were installed.
An additional number of intersections had accident
information available for a one year period before the RTOR
maneuver signs were installed and a one year period after
the signs were installed. A total of thirty-three inter-
sections had accident information by type available and a
total of fifty-four intersections had total number of
accidents available. The intersections used in the previous
analysis are included in these data groups. The first
group of data are the personal injury accidents. These
data are tabulated in Table 11. Since there are more than
thirty intersections in these groups a "Student's" t-test
could be properly used to test the null hypothesis that
there was no difference in the number of personal injury
accidents in the one year period before the RTOR maneuver
signs were installed than in the one year period after the
signs were installed. The procedure used here is the same
as the one followed with the four year accident data.
Since the computed t value was not in the critical region,
the null hypothesis could not be rejected. It should be
noted, however, that ten more personal injury accidents
occurred at these intersections during the after period.
The data tabulated in Table 12 are the property
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there was no difference in the number of property damage
accidents during the one year period before the RTOR
maneuver signs were installed, and the one year period
after the signs were installed could be rejected since
the computed t value did not fall in the critical region.
Here it is seen that fourteen less accidents occurred
during the one year period after the signs were installed.
An analysis of the pedestrian accidents was also con-
ducted. The data for this analysis are tabluated in Table
13. Since the computed t value does not fall in the cri-
tical region, the null hypothesis that there was no dif-
ference in the number of pedestrian accidents during the one
year period before the RTOR maneuver signs were installed
and during the one year period after the signs were installed
could not be rejected. The number of pedestrian accidents,
however, was increased by two in the after period.
The final analysis performed on accident data was for
the total accidents for fifty-four intersections during
the two year period. The data for this analysis are
tabulated in Table 14. The computed t value falls in the
critical region and the null hypothesis that there was no
difference in the total number of accidents in the one year
period before the RTOR maneuver signs were installed and
the one year period after the signs were installed could
be rejected. Since there were twenty-four fewer accidents
during the one year after period it can be concluded that
there were less accidents after the RTOR maneuver signs
were installed.
In summary, it is seen that the installation of RTOR
maneuver signs seems to have had very little affect on the
accident experience at RTOR maneuver intersections in
Indianapolis. Results were similar for both the two and
four year studies. For personal injury accident
examinations the number of personal injury accidents
increased after the signs were installed, but the increase
was not significant at an alpha level of .05. In a similar
o o o
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manner, the number of property damage accidents decreased,
but it also, was not a significant difference. It appears
that the number of pedestrian accidents increased after
the signs were installed. However, this increase was not
proven to be significant. Finally, the totat number of
accidents decreased for both the two year and the four year
studies. For the two year study, this difference was
significant at the cc = .05 level. Also, the four year total
accident study showed a significant difference at the
'^ = .10 level. The results of these tests are summarized
in Table 15.
Lafayette Study Intersection Accident Experience
After the RTOR maneuver signs had been in place in
Lafayette for six months, some accident information was
available. This information has been collected and is
discussed here. Due to the limited number of intersections
and the limited amount of accident experience, no absolute
conclusions can be drawn.
The intersection of Sixth and Main Streets had the
most accidents of the four intersections used in the study.
During the six month period before the RTOR maneuver signs
were installed six accidents were reported. Two of these
accidents involved vehicles striking illegally parked
vehicles while making right turns. Three other accidents
resulted from vehicles being struck in the rear. The
remaining accident involved a vehicle making a right turn.
After the signs were installed only one accident was
reported in six months. This accident involved a vehicle
being struck in the rear while making a right turn on a
green signal.
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Personal Injury 0.527 1.782







Personal Injury 0.683 1.694 No
Property Damage 0.663 1.694 No
Pedestrian 0.180 1.694 No
Total 1.775 1.675 Yes
Significant for «:= .10
**Insignif icant data available for statistical test
Note: Rejection of null hypothesis leads to the conclusion
of less accidents during the after period.
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At the intersection of Ninth and Ferry Streets six
accidents v;cre reported for the one year period. Tv;o of
these accidents occurred during the six month period before
the RTOR maneuver signs were installed. One accident
involved a vehicle being struck in the rear, and the other
accident involved a right turning vehicle. In the six
month period after the signs v/ere installed four accidents
were reported. Again one accident involved a vehicle
being struck in the rear. Tv/o accidents involved right
turning vehicles. The fourth accident was a vehicle
striking a power pole. Jlone of these vehicles involved
were RTOR maneuver vehicles.
The intersection of Eighteenth and Union Streets had
only two right angle accidents reported, one before the
RTOR maneuver signs were installed and one after the signs
were installed. The intersection of Sixteenth and Kossuth
Streets liad no accidents reported during the one year
period.
The RTOR maneuver does not appear to have any effect
on the accident experience. No sudden increase in the
accident experience v;as observed at the study intersections.
A total of nine accidents were reported at the four inter-
sections in the six month period before the signs v;ere
installed, but only six accidents were reported during the
six month period follov;ing the installation oif the signs.
It appears that the accidents are simlar in type and number
before and after the signs v;ere installed.
RTOP Usage
During both the Lafayette and Indianapolis studies,
the number of opportunities to perform a RTOR maneuver and
the number of times these opportunities were utilized
were recorded. These data were then used to compute the
percent of the opportunities which v;ere used. An opportunity
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to perform a RTOR maneuver was considered to exist when the
first vehicle in the right curb lane desired to turn right
while facing a red traffic signal and an appropriate gap
v;as available. It v/ac not considered to be a RTOR maneuver
opportunity unless the vehicle eventually turned right,
eitlier on the green or red signal indication. The number
of opportunities utilized v;ere the opportunities v.'hen a
vehicle performed the right turn before the signal changed
to green.
Initially, attempts v/ere made to develop equations
which v/ould predict the value of tliese variables based on
easily measured intersection characteristics. These
attempts at employing regression analyses proved to be
2unsuccessful in that no acceptable R values were developed.
The number of RTOR maneuver opportunities ranged from
a low of no opportunities to a high of 174 opportunities
per hour. The average number of opportunities v;as 16.00 per
hour. The number of RTOR maneuvers performed ranged from
a low on no maneuvers to a high of 173 maneuvers per hour.
The average number of maneuvers performed was 8.10 maneuvers
per hour. The percentage of the RTOR maneuver opportunities
which v.'ere utilized ranged from a low of zero percent to a
higli of one hundred percent. The average percent utilized
was fifty- four percent.
Since it did not prove feasible to develop equations
to predict tlie usage of the RTOR maneuver, it became
appropriate to attempt to determine v/hich intersection
characteristics could be associated with a higher degree
of usage. To do this, analysis of variance v/as employed.
All of the null hypotheses tested here were that there was
no difference in the means of the two groups tested. In
all of these tests v^ is equal to one and an alpha value
of .05 is used unless specified otherv/ise.
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The data vere grouped for each test by dividing the
data into t'.'<-"> :;roups based on the intersection characteristic;
being tested. A Bartlett-Box F test v;as used to test for
homogeneity of variance v/ith an a value of a = .05 for
each test.
Only tv;o intersection characteristics v;ere found to
have any reasonable effect on the number of RTOR maneuvers.
The data were divided into two groups, one with
intersections having a right-tum-only lane and the other
v/ith intersections not having right-turn-only lanes. The
group v;ith the exclusive turning lane had an average
number of RTOR maneuver occurrences of 12.96 and the group
without had an average number of occurrences of 6.42. The
computed F value for this division of the data was F = 14.34.
The critical value for a = ,05 and v = 294 is F = 3.95.
The null hypothesis can be rejected, and it can be concluded
that intersection approaches v;ith right-turn-only lanes
had more RTOR occurrences than the intersection approaches
without the exclusive lane.
The data were divided into groups with two phases per
•cycle and more than two phases per cycle. The average
number of RTOR maneuver occurrences was 7.77 for the group
with two phases per cycle and 12.70 for the group with
more than two pliases per cycle. The computed F value for
this grouping was 2.59. If an alpha value of .11 is used
the critical F value for v„ = 294 degrees of freedom is
2.55. At this alpha level, the null hypothesis can be
rejected. It is therefore probable that the number of RTOR
maneuver occurrences \;as greater at intersection approaches
with more than two phases per cycle than at intersection
approaches with tv;o phases per cycle.
As a result of nonhomogeneity of variance, other
groupings for other intersection characteristics could not
be tested in this manner. It was noted that one intersection
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characteristic, intersection approaches v;ith a right-turn-
only lanG, had an average nvunber of RTOR maneuver
occurrences of 30.72 and intersection approaches without
right-turn-only lanes had an average number of RTOP.
maneuver opportunities of only 10.86.
Percent usage of opportunities at RTOR maneuver
intersections v;as also analyzed in the same manner as for
occurrences. Four intersection characteristics vere
found to be significant factors in tlie percent utilized.
When the intersection approaches were divided into
a group with the cross traffic speed greater than thirty-
five miles per hour and a group with the cross traffic
speed less than thirty-four miles per hour, the approaches
with slower cross traffic had an average percentage of
use of fifty-six percent and the approaches with faster
cross traffic had an average percentage of use of forty-
five percent. The computed F value for this grouping of
data was F = 5.64, and the critical F value for a = .05
and v_ = 294 is F = 3.95. The null hypothesis can be
rejected, and it can be concluded that a larger percentage
of drivers who were given the opportunity to perform a RTOR
maneuver did so v;hen the cross traffic speed was slower
than when it was liigher.
By dividing the intersection characteristics into a
group v;ith cycle lengths greater than sixty-nine seconds
and cycle lengths less than sixty-nine seconds, the first
group had an average percentage of use of thirty-seven
percent and the second group had an average percentage of
use of fifty-four percent. The com.puted F value for this
grouping was F = 13.38. The critical value for a = .05
and v^ = 294 degrees of freedom is F = 3.95. The null
hypothesis can be rejected hero, and it can be concluded
that more drivers utilized the RTOR maneuver when the
opportunity presented itself v;hen the cycle length was
shorter than v;hen the cycle: length was longer. This
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finding v;as surprising and may have resulted because of
other intcrr.oction charactoristics associated v/ith short
and long cycles. Certainly further study of this indicated
conclusion is desirable.
When the data v.'ere divided into a group v/ith. one
through lane of cross traffic and a group v;ith tv.'o or more
through lanes of cross traffic, the first group had an
average percentage use of fifty-nine percent and the second
group has an average percentage of use of fifty-one percent
the computed F value for th.is grouping of data v/as F = 4.81.
The critical value for a = .05 and v. = 294 degrees of
freedom v;as F = 2.95. The null hypothesis can be rejected,
and it can bo concluded that a higher percentage of drivers
utilized a RTOR maneuver opportunity v.'hen there was only
one through lane on the cross street than when there v;as
more than one through lane. This too may be surprising and
should be further researched.
By dividing the data into a group v;ith sight distance
less than 285 feet and a group with sight distance greater
than 285 feet, it is found that the first group has an
average percentage cf use of forty-five percent and the
second group has an average percentage of use of fifty-seven
percent. The computed F value for this grouping of the
data is I-' = 6.G3. The critical F value for a = .05 and
v^ = 294 degrees of freedom is F = 3.95. Again the null
hypothesis can be rejected, and it can be concluded that
more did utilize RTOR maneuver opportunity when the sight
distance was greater than v/hen the siglit distance v;as
shorter.
The data were grouped by other intersection cliaracter-
istics, but none of the groupings proved to have a
significant difference at the a = .05 level. However, v;hen
the data are divided into groups with pedestrian signals
and v.-ithout pedestrian signals tlie average percentage of
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usage v;as sixty percent for the first group and fifty-one
percent for the second group. The computed F value for
this grouping of data is 3.49. The critical F value for
a level of .10 and v_ of 294 degrees of freedom is 2.74.
The null hypothesis can now be rejected at this alpha
level, and it can be concluded that it is probable that
a larger percentage of drivers utilized RTOR maneuver
opportunities at intersection approaches v/ith pedestrian
signals.
The problem of nonhomogeneity of variance prevented
the analysis of RTOR maneuver occurrences by means of
analysis of variance. However, observations were made
concerning the number of RTOR maneuver occurrences. At
intersection approaches with only one through lane of
cross traffic the average number of RTOR maneuver
opportunities was 10-46 and the intersection approaches
with more than one through lane of cross traffic had an
average number of RTOR maneuver occurrences of 6.54. When
the data were divided into a group of intersection approaches
with the speed on the approach less than thirty-four miles
per hour the average number of RTOR maneuver occurrences
was 7.22 and a group of intersection approahces with the
speed on the approach greater than thirty-five miles per
hour the average number of RTOR mameuver occurrences was
20.15.
Delay Reduction
A portion of the Lafayette study was designed to
examine the reduction in vehicle delay at signalized inter-
sections resulting from the RTOR maneuver. More specifically,
the delay reduction analysis was for right turning vehicles.
An average travel time making a right- turn from the study
approach was determined for both the before and after study.
The delay reduction was taken to be the difference between
the average travel time before and the average travel time after.
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The reduced delay for the twelve approaches at the
four intersections used in the Lafayette study ranged in
value from a low of minus .20 of one second (an increase in
delay of .20 of one second), to a high of 15.23 seconds.
The reduced delay data are displayed in Table 16. These
differences were examined by means of the "Student's"
t-test to determine if the differences were significant.
To properly use the "Student's" t-test to test the equality
of two groups of data it is necessary to determine that the
variances are equal. The ratio of the before and after
1 2variances, S2/S2f were compared to the critical F value for
the appropriate degrees of freedom. The hypothesis that
the "before and after variances were equal was rejected for
four intersection approaches; Union and Eignteenth Streets
northbound. Ferry Street and Ninth Street westbound, Kossuth
Street and Sixteenth Street northbound, and Kossuth Street
and Sixteenth Street eastbound.
The square root transformation was successfully used
on the data for Union Street and Eighteenth Street northbound,
The mean value of the transformed before data is 5.3 6 seconds
and of the transformed after data is 4.20 seconds. The
variance of the transformed before data is 1.228 and of
the transformed after data is 0.743. The ratio of the before
and after variances is 1.653 which is less than the critical
F value of F _ - 1.705, and the null hypothesis of
equal variances can not be rejected. It was concluded that
the transformed data have equal variances. The values
presented here were used to calculate the t value in Table 16,
Again a square root transformation was succesfully
used on the data for Kossuth Street and Sixteenth Street
eastbound. The mean value of the transformed defore data
is 4.83 seconds and of the transformed after data is 4.21
seconds. The variance of the transformed before data
is 0.229 and, the variance of the transformed
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after data is 0.207. The ratio of the before and after
variances is 1.098 which is less than the critical F value
of F Qc- on T-i = 1.785, and the null hypothesis of equal
variances can not be rejected. It was concluded that the
transformed data have equal variances. The values presented
here were used to calculate the t value shown in Table 16.
Several transformations (square root, logarithm,
inverse, etc.) were attempted on the data for the westbound
approaches to the intersections of Ferry Street and Ninth
Street and Kossuth Street with Sixteenth Street, but they
failed to give equal variances for the transformed before
and after data. Therefore it was appropriate to use an
estimate of the t value for unequal variances for these two
approaches. The computed t estimates are shown in Table 16.
It is seen that only the westbound approach to the inter-
section of Kossuth and Sixteenth Streets and the southbound
approach to intersection of Ferry and Ninth Streets did
not have a significant difference in the before and after
period. There are not any intersection characteristics common
to these two approaches and uncommon to the other approaches.
The westbound approach to the intersection of Kossuth and
Sixteenth Streets had a very short red time and another
signal one block upstream from the intersection.
Table 16 indicates that the delay reduction for the north-
bound approach to the intersection of Kossuth and Sixteenth
Streets and the eastbound approach to the intersection of
Ferry and Ninth Streets were not statistically significant
at an alpha level of .05, but the delay reductions at these
two approaches were significant at an alpha level of .10
Only one intersection approach, westbound approach at the
intersection of Kossuth and Sixteenth Streets, had an increase
in the travel time in the after period. However, this increase
was only 0.20 seconds and was not statistically significant.
Of the differences that were found to be significant, the
smallest difference was 0.98 seconds, and the largest was
15.23 seconds. These differences are displayed in Table 16.
71
fO
CNJ O r^j CN CM CN +J m





r~ 1X> •rr CM in r-- UD UD in rvj 00 00 13 >i
M CO in m ':J' a\ 00 VO 00 r~ WD <T\ 3 13
OJ • • • • . • • • • • -P 3
+J fN CN V£> ro >X) in 00 [^ UD ^ H in ^ r- en •P
IM W r-\ r^ <D r- '^ OM 00 in 00 <-{ 'J' Ui




iX> ro CJ^ r-{ cr^ ^ 00 r^ in a^ CN 0) 4H
tc CO CO in CN f-i 00 H ^ 00 o^ r^ X! m
CN • • • • . • . • • • . •
|x a> CO rH VD r~- r-~ in CT\ r- 00 r-~ CX) (D (U













^^ CM ro CTi OM cr\ 00 00 "C r- r- Sh Sh
CN yD in a> CN <D •>* H r^ 00 CO (13 (C
IW • • • • • • • • • • . > >
cu CN rH, 00 LD in H ONJ 'i" r-i va< a^ ^ CO
CQ CO t^ CTi <-^ OM ^ rH in 00 t-i 00 r~ II II
(N rH CN rH r-{ <-{ 0-1 OMrHOJ C\
CO CO
(TV in CTi tn ^ rv] r- CO r- r-
•: 00 cr\ a\ r-~ CN r^ ^ CO (Ti CT\
-H • . • • • • . • • • • .
IX •^ CJ\ en en ,-^ <-{ 00 r-i r- ,-H CO COn (M
13















'O C t3 C 13 C 13 C 13 C 15 C 0) U
^ C 3 C 3 C 3 C 3 C C 3 Sh Sh <u
(0 u 3 13 3 :3 :3 3 0) >i m
-p (0 X! X! XI X X X MH +J 13 >i
m -Q 4:: X! x; X! x: X! x\ X! x: XI x: 0) IH 3 13 c
Q 5-1 -P -P -P -p -P p +J -p -p -p -P -p X! tC +J =1 •H
a W U cn p W !h W 3 en u W 3 UJ -P
c a (C 0) QJ (C OJ m C c m cn
< w 2 S CO S 2 W CO & 2 w CO •H H QJ QJ
-H U u E
-p (U (U QJ •H
o • e e iw -p -P
3 -p •H -H QJ IW
-a • CO -P -P Xi nj r-t










>1 ^ CO 00 > > Sh
(0 -p x: H rC (0 QJ G P
rH CO -C -p V^ Sh N N











+J • . CO (0 rC rH rH QJ












(U u C >1 3 < < CO CO rH
rH Q) c Jh in rH
X! -p •H H >H to II II II II <
fO c C ro 0) •-{ CM H oj





































































^ "^ -cr 'S'
1X1 VD 1X> VO
CO 00 00 00
in in in in
00 00 00 CO



















































































































iH rH iH nH iH rH iH nH rH M iH iH 3 o
c
o
ro o 00 ro ^ in "* OJ in CM r-~ vD u
CO 1^ CTi •^ r^ o^ o CM o in kD ^ o d)CM iX>
• •





































































m m u) en en ui (0 (n m en
dJ (U 0) CD QJ QJ 0) 2 S 0) 0) 0)
>H >H >H >H >H IX >H >H >H >H





















O O tn en
z; 2 0) 0)
03 e
Q) * *
(1) •n * -K
)-l m Q) 00 00 00 00 in CO 00 oo O ^ O O





K * * -X
o in CN 00 in (Ti CM US rH ro -^ >x>
CO VD in ro .H <* 00 en ro r~- (Ti 00
• • • • •
fO 'T in rH n CO '3'
O iH VD CN
ro r- ^ CO (T-. iH O 'S' O 00 00 (N
o in n in CM in r- 00 ovj in o> in
in iH cNj r~- "d* -^ r- M O 00 o «*
rH rH rH 1
T3 T) •O n Ti 'O
-O C ^ c T) C TJ C ^3 C T3 C
C 3 C 3 C Hi C 3 C 3 C 3
3 :3 3 3 O 3 O 3
O XJ O X! X! X5 XI O X3
^ j:; Xi £: Xi ^ XI x: X! ^ X2 -C
-P -P -p -p -P -P -P -P P -P -P -P
en >-i en a tn U en 3 to h en 3
(0 0) o Q) fO 0) n3 O










































,-, c 1 (C
CN \ T!
C OM CN (N\ CO r- TJ





rH , rH en
c iH C\ C 1 (0
CN i-i \ ^1







c 4-1 •\ E 4->
N CN Tl X
CO -d 0) 0)—
0) -P +J
(U 3





.H i*-l O TJ
c O 0)\ (U CO
CN rH in 3 CO
CO Q) ^ 3










In both the Lafayette and Indianapolis studies, driver
irritation incidents were recorded. These irritation
occurrences were any occurrence which seemed to indicate
that a driver desired the vehicle in front of him to per-
form the RTOR maneuver. In the study, as expected, the
only form of driver irritation observed was a driver
sounding his horn.
Only one intersection approach in the Lafayette study
had any driver irritation displayed. This intersection
approach was eastbound Union Street at Eighteenth Street.
During the four hour after period, eight incidents of
driver irritation were observed. It should be noted that
the after study was conducted only one month after the
signs were installed, and it is very probable that many
drivers were not yet familiar with the maneuver. Also,
while the approach does not have an exclusive right- turn
lane, the right curb lane has a high right-turning volume
and someone not familiar with the intersection could perceive
this lane to be an exclusive right-turn lane.
During the Indianapolis study, six intersection
approaches experienced driver irritation occurrences. Only
the eastbound approach at the intersection of Alabama and
North Streets had more than one occurrence of driver
irritation, and it had two in a four hour period. The east-
bound approaches to the intersections of Bluff Road and Troy
Avenue and Michigan and Alabama Streets; the northbound
approaches to the intersections of Sherman Avenue and
Twenty-first Street and Alabama and North Streets; and the
southbound approach to the intersection of Emerson Avenue
and Sixteenth Street had one dirver irritation occurrence
each. These intersections have very few common character-
istics. Some are located near the CBD emd some are
located in outlying residential areas. These intersections
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have relatively high volumes on the study approaches. How-
ever, it appears that these driver irritation occurrences
were very random in nature.
The most notable finding observed is the response to
driver irritation occurrences. During the Lafayette study
only one driver performed a RTOR maneuver when the driver
behind him sounded his horn. It appeared that the other
drivers either did not see the sign or they felt unsafe in
performing the maneuver.
A similar situation was observed during the Indianapolis
study. Only once each, at the eastbound approaches to the
intersection of Alabama and North Streets and Bluff
Road and Troy Avenue, was a response to a driver irritation
occurrence seen. Again, it appears that a driver will not
yield to pressure and perform the RTOR maneuver. If he
does not perform the maneuver at his earliest convenience,
he will probably not perform the maneuver at all.
Pedestrian Delay
As was mentioned earlier, the problem of pedestrian
delay resulting from a RTOR maneuver was of interest to
this study. In the Lafayette study, pedestrian delay
resulting from the RTOR maneuver was considered to be the
difference in the pedestrian delay by type observed during
the before and after study. For the Indianapolis study,
the RTOR maneuver pedestrian delay was taken to be the
number of pedestrains delayed by vehicles performing a
RTOR maneuver and was recorded by type.
Very few occurrences of pedestrian delays were observed.
At the intersection of Main and Sixth Streets in Lafayette
two pedestrians were forced to wait on the curb by a right
turning vehicle during one hour of the before study. Three
other pedestrians were forced to wait on the curb by a
vehicle turning right on a green signal during a different
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hour of the after study at the same intersection. In each
instance the pedestrians were together in one group. At
the intersection of Kossuth and Sixteenth Streets in
Lafayette one pedestrian was forced to wait in the middle
of the street by a right turning vehicle. No other
pedestrian delays were observed in the Lafayette study.
Of the pedestrian delays observed, it appeared that
the pedestrians hesitated and, therefore, induced the
vehicle to proceed with the turn. No pedestrian delays
were observed during either the Lafayette study or the
Indianapolis study resulting from a RTOR maneuver.
Pedestrian volumes in the study ranged from zero to
approximately 130 pedestrians per hour with the majority of
the samples having approximately seventy or less pedestrians
per hour. It appears that the RTOR maneuver has no adverse
effects on pedestrian travel up to the pedestrian volumes
observed.
Of the intersection approaches studied in Indianapolis
thirteen had pedestrian walk-wait signals. Some concern
has been expressed about intersections with pedestrian
signals and the RTOR maneuver. However, at the inter-
section approaches with pedestrian signals in this study
no situations were found which indicated that this problem
exists at the volumes examined.
Only one potential problem is seen with regard to
pedestrians and the RTOR maneuver. If no pedestrian is
immediately present when a vehicle arrives which intends
to perform a RTOR maneuver, the vehicle may pull across the
crosswalk before stopping. If a pedestrian arrives before
the vehicle completes his turn, the pedestrian must either
wait for the vehicle to move or walk out of the crosswalk
and around the vehicle. This situation, however, was not
observed to occur in this study. As pedestrian volume
increases, the probability of a pedestrian being present
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when a vehicle arrives increases and with a pedestrian
present, a vehicle is much more likely to stop behind the
crosswalk.
Gap Analysis
The term gap as used here does not have the connotative
meaning normally used with regard to vehicular traffic.
Here, a gap is an opening between two vehicles in the cross
street traffic which is large enough to permit one vehicle
to make a right turn into the cross street traffic. If
the distance between two vehicles on the cross street is
large enough to allow two vehicles to enter, two gaps were
counted. In essence, the number of gaps for each opening
were recorded as the number of possible vehicle entries.
The number of gaps in the cross traffic was determined by
observing the cross traffic and recording a gap when the
observer saw a gap large enough for one vehicle to enter.
If the gap proved to be large enough for more than one
vehicle to enter, the appropriate number of gaps was
recorded.
Since the intersections used in the study had various
cycle lengths and various percentages of red time, it
became necessary to calculate gaps in terms of hours of
red time on the approach. To analyze the data, it was
decided to relate the number of gaps to the appropriate
volume on the cross street. Therefore, cross street
volumes were calculated in terms of vehicles on the cross
street per hour of red time on the approach.
To examine these data, the computed gaps per hour of
red time were plotted against the computed volume on the
cross street per hour of red time on the approach. To
properly examine the data, they were divided into two
groups. The first group was for cross streets with only
one lane of traffic in each direction. The plot for the
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data from this group is illustrated in Figure 4. The line
fitted to these plotted points was determined with the use
of nonlinear regression. The equation for this line is:
gaps = 5286.99 (volume) "0 • 03 - 4051.08
The gaps used here are the number of gaps in the cross
traffic per hour of red on the approach. The volume is
the volume of traffic on the cross street per hour of red
on the approach. An approximate R^ value for this equation is
is .92.
The remainder of the data is for cross streets with
more than one lane of traffic. The plot for this data is
illustrated in Figure 5. The line fitted to these plotted
points was again determined with use of nonlinear regression.
The equation for this line is:
gaps = 456.46 - 0.32 (volume) °-^^
The gaps are the number of gaps in the cross traffic per
hour of red on the approach. The volume used here is the
volume on the cross street per hour of red on the approach.
An approximate R value for this equation is .90.
As can be seen in Figures 4 and 5, the plotted points are
somewhat scattered. This condition can probably be attri-
buted to the data collection technique. Even with the
scattered data points fairly high R^ values were obtained.
2The larger R" values result from the technique used to compute
them for the nonlinear regression and are considerably
2larger than the R values found using linear regression.
The values shown by the fitted lines in Figures 4 and
5 are by no means absolute values, but rather an approximate
value that can be expected at a given intersection based on
the number of lanes of cross traffic, and the volume of
through vehicles on the cross street. This number of gaps
thus found would be the maximum number of vehicles which
could perform the RTOR maneuver provided a continuous
queue of right turning vehicles is available.
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As was mentioned earlier, only one and two lanes of
cross traffic in one direction were used in this study.
However, some opportunities were available to observe more
than two lanes of cross traffic. It was seen that a vehicle
perfomning a RTOR maneuver generally required a gap available
in both of the first two lanes of cross traffic. Drivers
however, did not appear to require gaps in a third lane to
perform a RTOR maneuver. For intersection approaches with
more than two lanes of cross traffic. Figure 5 should
reasonalby well approximate the relationship between the
number of gaps per hour and the volume of traffic in the
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From the analysis of the data in this research
project certain observations and findings were made. These
observations and findings were:
1. A frequently stated concern about the RTOR
maneuver is that the number of accidents will
increase. It was found that at the inter-
sections studied there was no increase in the
total number of accidents. However, in the
after period at the Indianapolis sites, a non-
significant increase in total pedestrian
accidents was noted. Collision diagrams pre-
pared from the accident data indicated, however,
that very few pedestrian accidents could have
resulted from a RTOR maneuver.
2. Concern has also been expressed that pedestrians
will be needlessly delayed or exposed to un-
necessary accident hazards with the use of the
RTOR maneuver. This study examined inter-
section approaches with pedestrian values up to
130 pedestrians per hour. No pedestrian was
observed who had been placed in a more hazardous
situation because of a RTOR maneuver during
any of the data collection periods. Further,
not a single example of pedestrian delay caused
by a RTOR maneuver vehicle was observed. One
potential problem between the RTOR maneuver and
pedestrians, especially those approaching but
not yet in the crosswalk, could result from
vehicles encroaching on the crosswalk. This
problem, however, was not observed, perhaps
because all approaches had adequate sight
distances of the cross street from the normal
stop position. Most of the few pedestrians
observed v;ho were delayed, all by right turn on
green vehicles, hesitated in their crossing and
thereby induced the motorist to continue his
movement.
3. RTOR maneuver opportunities and actual use of
these opportunities varied from intersection
approach to intersection approach. Opportunities
for RTOR maneuvers were utilized best when:
a. A right-turn-only lane was available
b. Cross street traffic speed was low
c. Signal cycle length was short
d. There was only one through lane on the
cross street
e. Sight distance of cross street traffic was
long
f. There were more than two phases in the
signal cycle
g. There were pedestrian signals present. •
4. Delay reduction to right turning vehicles re-
sulting from the RTOR maneuver v;as found. No
occurrences of increased delay for right-
turning vehicles was found. The amount of
average delay reduction was found to vary from
intersection approach to intersection approach,
depending heavily on length of red time on the
approach, and varied from almost zero reduction
to as much as fifteen seconds per right turning
vehicle that used the RTOR maneuver.
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Very little driver irritation v/as found with
the RTOR maneuver, even in locations v;here it
had been recently implemented. Tlie only form
witnessed v/as an occasional horn-blowing by
a stopped following vehicle. Such notice to
the driver ahead almost never resulted in his
utilization of RTOR maneuver.
The question of the availability of opportunities
in the cross traffic for vehicles desiring to
perform a RTOR maneuver was also examined. The
number of opportunities for vehicles to enter
the cross traffic per hour of red time on the
approach was plotted against the volume of
vehicles on the cross street per hour of red
time on the approach. This procedure was
followed for one lane of cross traffic and for
more than one lane of cross traffic. Fitted
lines to these plots can be used to approximate
the maximum number of opportunities a RTOR
maneuver could be performed from any approach
knowing the cross street traffic volum.e and red
time on the approach.
From previous studies on acceptance of gaps by
right-turning vehicles made at Purdue University
(7.36 seconds for median acceptability), it was
found that the sight distances shown below should
be available where the RTOR maneuver is permitted.
To minimize blocking of the crosswalk, such
distances should be available to a motorist
when stopped at the stop line (or where it












On the basis of the findings of this study and
experience indicated in the literature the
following Warrants for Prohibiting the RTOR
maneuver are suggested:
a. The RTOR maneuver should be prohibited for
safety reasons where:
1. Sight distance of cross street traffic
as shown in the above table is not
available to the potential RTOR maneuver
motorist at the stop line on his
approach.
2. A separate signal phase for a turning
movement exists at the intersection
which would conflict with a RTOR
movement (the RTOR motorist may not be




3. The intersection has more than four
approaches (at such locations cross
street traffic which conflicts with the
RTOR maneuver may not be quickly iden-
tified by the RTOR motorist or the RTOR
motorist may be able to turn into more




The RTOR maneuver may be prohibited because
of little benefit from the maneuver at
locations where
:
1. There is very short red time for the
approach.
2. Cross street traffic is heavy for many
hours of the signal-operating day
(where the cross street is operating
at capacity for many hours of the day)
.
3. Pedestrian use of the crossivalk on the
approach is heavy for many hours of
the signal-operatinq day (at least one
pedestrian is in the crosswalk during
the red time for the RTOR motorist for
many cycles during the day)
.
4. Little right turn demand exists and
there is no right-turn only lane
available.
The RTOR maneuver may be prohibited because
of possible adverse public reaction where:
1. A school crossing route passes through
the intersection.
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Table A-1. Indianapolis Study Intersection Approaches
Location
Bluff Road-Troy Avenue
Delaware St. -St. Clair St.
Emerson Avenue-16th St.
Market St. -Alabama St.
Michigan St. -Alabama St.
Michigan St. -Blake St.
North St. -Alabama St.
North St. -New Jersey St.
Pennsylvania St. -St. Joseph St.


























Northbound, Westbound , South-
bound
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